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Population mobility and wealth transfers in Indonesia and other Third World societies

Graeme J. Hugo

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PREFACE

This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Seminar on Interrelationships Between Demographic Factors and Income Distribution: Individuals and Families in Income Distribution, organized by the Committee on Interactions Between Demographic Variables and Income Distribution of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and held 6–9 April 1981 in Honolulu, Hawaii. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Department of Demography, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and the East-West Population Institute in the preparation of the paper. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referees of the paper, who provided helpful and insightful comments on an earlier version.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the complex interrelationships between population mobility and income distribution in developing societies. It focuses especially upon the links established and maintained by movers with the families they leave behind and the ways in which these links relate to income distribution. In particular, it examines the impact and role of remittances. First, the difficulties of measuring remittances are discussed, and caution is advised in interpreting remittance data. Next, the paper investigates the frequently overlooked interrelationship between types of population mobility and remittances It then examines the incidence, extent, and determinants of remittances in Indonesia, particularly West Java, focusing on the role of the family. The implications of remittance patterns for income distribution are also discussed. The findings are related to those obtained from a review of the literature concerned with remittances in other low-income countries. Finally, some general comments are made concerning the role of migration and population mobility in intergenerational wealth flows within families and its significance with respect to Caldwell's wealth-flows theory of fertility decline.

THE PRECISE NATURE, direction, and magnitude of the complex, two-way interactive relationships between demographic variables and income distribution are little understood. The growing literature concerned with these relationships has concentrated upon the connections between income distribution and such demographic variables as rates of population growth, family formation, fertility, mortality, and age structure. As is the case in much demographic analysis, migration and population mobility have remained the poor relation among the major demographic processes, for little effort has been devoted to investigating their significance in relation to income distribution. The bulk of migration theory and most empirical studies assign a key role to income-related factors in initiating population movement from one region to another. In this paper, the emphasis is not so much upon the individuals and families who move as upon the links they establish and maintain with the families whom they leave behind and the ways in which those links relate to income distribution. In examining those links and their significance for income distribution, I focus attention on Indonesia and particularly on one region, West Java–Jakarta, where I conducted a detailed case study of population mobility and the wealth flows associated with it (Hugo, 1975, 1978). However, this paper places the discussion of the topic in a more general context by

relating the Indonesian findings to a wider body of literature dealing with wealth transfers between movers and their places of origin in the developing world.

At the outset some key terms need to be clarified. The term "wealth flow" is adopted from Caldwell's (1976) theory of fertility decline based on wealth transfers between parents and children and is defined as all money, goods, services, and guarantees that one person provides for another. The term "wealth" is used instead of "income" so as to emphasize that the transactions involved in the flows are not all monetary. A fundamental distinction can be made between two types of wealth flow between and within households that are of contemporary significance in the Third World. The first type of flow consists of the periodic gifts, regular payments, and services that have traditionally been made between individuals and groups residing *within* a community, in order to support some members of that community or see them through a period of need. These individuals and groups are often, but not always, linked by family ties. The second type of wealth flow takes place between groups or individuals linked by ties that are usually family based but who reside in geographically separated communities. The latter flows usually take place as a result of some form of population mobility or migration, and it is upon them that most of the attention of this paper focuses.

When population movement does occur in low-income societies, strong linkages are usually established and maintained between movers at their destinations and their families and relatives who remain in the villages of origin. One of the most important results of these origin-to-destination ties is the two-way flow of money and resources. In migration research the term "remittance" is usually applied to money sent by migrants to their respective home areas. Following Connell et al. (1976), however, this paper extends the meaning of remittance to include the total flow of money and goods that migrants send or bring personally back to the area of origin (in-remittances) and also reciprocal flows from origin to destination (out-remittances). It is these flows—their extent, determinants, effects, and implications—that are the main focus of this paper.

It should be stressed that the concept of wealth flows is a much broader one than that of remittances. A wealth flow encompasses all money, goods, services, and guarantees provided by one person to another. It is a dynamic phenomenon, since both the volume and the

direction of the flow varies over the life cycle of the family. The wealth transfer between parents and children is an aggregate measure of the net flow over the lifetime of the parents. Remittances, on the other hand, are confined to flows of money and goods and are customarily measured over a more restricted time interval. They therefore exclude services and guarantees, which are important elements in wealth flows between generations. Moreover, the volume and direction of the flow of remittances between a migrant and his or her family of origin during a particular year do not necessarily indicate either the net value or the overall direction of a wealth flow over the lifetime of the parent household. Thus, even if remittances can be shown to constitute the major part of the intergenerational transfer of wealth over the life cycle, the measurement of remittances over a limited period, without reference to the life-cycle stages of donors or recipients, cannot be taken as a reliable indication of even the direction of the net wealth transfers that are relevant to Caldwell's theory of fertility decline. Remittances represent only one subset of the totality of wealth flows within a society or family, although they can be a very important element in such flows.

MOBILITY, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

One of the most significant contributions to demographic knowledge of the last decade has been the reformulation of the demographic transition theory undertaken by Caldwell (1976, 1980). His theory, which explains stable high fertility in pretransitional societies and the onset of fertility decline in relation to net intergenerational wealth flows, suggests that fertility will fall once the net flow of wealth stops favoring parents and begins favoring children. Thus the fertility transition is dependent upon a change occurring in the distribution of income within the family.

This paper contends that population movement is of significance to Caldwell's wealth-flow theory in two fundamental areas. First, the nature, intensity, and pattern of population movement frequently influence the magnitude and type of net intergenerational wealth transfers that occur within a society. Second, this mobility often has a role in initiating the transition across what Caldwell (1976) refers to as "a great divide," a point where the compass needle hesitatingly begins to swing 180 degrees, from the situation in which the net flow of wealth

is upward, toward parents, and high fertility is thus rational, to the situation in which the flow is toward children and high fertility is not rational. These linkages between fertility and population mobility are frequently overlooked because demographers tend to focus their investigations on single demographic processes such as fertility or migration. Yet the processes shaping population size, growth, structure, and distribution are tightly and inextricably interrelated (Friedlander, 1969:359).

The main task of this paper is to address the first of the two propositions advanced above—that is, to demonstrate the significance of population mobility and the remittances associated with that mobility in shaping the pattern of intergenerational wealth transfers. The paper also discusses the second proposition, regarding the role of population mobility in changing the direction of net intergenerational wealth flows.

Population mobility and the wealth transfers associated with it have a role not only in changing patterns of income distribution within the family but also, at a different level of scale, in initiating changes in income inequalities between regions. Indonesia, like much of the Third World, has a high overall incidence of poverty, and its pattern of income distribution is characterized by major interregional, rural-urban, intracommunity, and class disparities (Hugo, 1980, 1981e). The role of population movement in relation to income disparities in poor countries is a subject of debate in the literature. Neoclassical economists argue that voluntary population movements act in such a way as to reduce spatial inequalities in income distribution, whereas others have maintained that migration exacerbates spatial disparities in income distribution (Lipton, 1980:1). This issue of the interrelationship between population movement and interregional differences in income distribution constitutes a second theme relating to migration, remittances, and income distribution addressed in this paper.

THE MEASUREMENT OF REMITTANCES

In recent years several review studies have attempted to arrive at a consensus regarding whether regions of out-migration in less-developed countries have generally benefited from that out-migration (e.g., Amin, 1974; Connell et al., 1976; Connell, 1981; Griffen, 1976; Byres, 1979; Lipton, 1977, 1980; Rempel and Lobdell, 1978). Remittances constitute a major preoccupation in such studies; but they do not, as Connell

(1981:231) points out, represent the only element in the calculus of gain or benefit from migration in areas of origin. Such elements as transmission of skills, status and experience, flows of ideas, loss of economic and political leaders, and social disruption can influence development in an area of origin. But commentators have tended to focus attention on the role of remittances in rural development. Several (Amin, 1974; Connell, 1981; Lipton, 1977, 1980; Rempel and Lobdell, 1978) have suggested that the effect of money flows to villages of origin in the Third World is small and in many cases even, on balance, negative.

> The sparse evidence suggests that *net* remittances are quite small relative to village income, are concentrated on richer village households unlikely to suffer from capital constraints, and tend to be little used to finance investment, except in house-building. . . . (Lipton, 1980:3).

Others (e.g., Griffin, 1976; Byres, 1979) have argued, in contrast, that the net effect of remittances in out-migration villages is emphatically positive.

> Internal migration is likely to improve the distribution of income in rural areas. . . . Migration, in effect, enables the peasantry to overcome the imperfection of the rural credit market by creating opportunities to amass finance capital in the cities for subsequent investment in agriculture. . . . (Griffin, 1976:359).

Proponents of both points of view are able to marshall an impressive number of case studies to support their views. Only Connell (1981: 231–32) has sounded a cautionary note regarding the limitations of remittance data in such studies, and even he does not specify what the limitations are or how they should be taken into account in interpreting the studies' findings.

Elsewhere I have discussed some of the problems encountered in detecting wealth flows in West Java through intensive village studies (Hugo, 1977). The scope for error is considerable, even when highly-skilled and well-trained interviewers are used. Memory recall problems are a major difficulty. Corner, for example, found that "The men appeared fairly reliable in disclosing their expenditures but often did not think to mention to the recorder if money was received [although] . . . there seemed no reluctance to disclose the information" (1981:127). Another problem is recognizing that some flows constitute remittances (e.g., contributions to help pay educational expenses of siblings or to mount life-cycle ceremonies). There are difficulties in placing a realis-

tic monetary value on the considerable flows of goods and produce; in many surveys these important flows are ignored altogether. Recall problems are exacerbated if the remittances are irregular and sent or brought back personally on a return visit to the village. (Such remittances are also overlooked in many studies.)

Unless there is detailed questioning of respondents—and this implies not only intensive training of interviewers but also field participation and field checking by the chief investigators—there is likely to be substantial underestimation of wealth flows. Many of the remittance studies reviewed do not include any measurement of out-remittances, so that no realistic impression of the net effect of income flows can be obtained from them. If one interviews the migrants themselves, they may inflate their estimates of income transfers to "save face" with the interviewer. Corner points out the difficulty of assessing how important remittances are in the total family budget at the place of origin because "home-produced and home-consumed items form a significant proportion of real-income and defy accurate measurement and valuation" (1981:120). If these and other difficulties of collecting remittance information are assumed away, especially in large-scale studies, the data used must be considered suspect.

Another important research issue is the period over which the remittances are measured. The usual convention is to attempt, on one hand, to avoid bias due to seasonal variations in remittances by collecting data for a year or more and, on the other, to minimize recall problems by questioning respondents at one time regarding out- and in-remittances over the reference period. Even if one assumes that respondents accurately report remittances received or sent during the reference period, there are problems associated with this approach if the aim is to gain an accurate impression of the volume of remittances. Many investigations (e.g., Corner, 1981:128) have found that remittances are sent irregularly and hence may not be detected from a question about a fixed time period. Yet such remittances may consist of quite large amounts, perhaps sent to meet a specific need—for example, to purchase land, build a house, compensate for the failure of an agricultural crop, contribute toward the costs of an expensive ceremony, or establish a business. Large remittances like these provide social insurance by alleviating crises. Hence, although they may be "called in" at any time and be seen as having critical importance to the well-being of the village household, their infrequency means that

they are rarely detected by the conventional remittance question.[1] In fact, the use of a fixed reference period to measure wealth flows may have led some investigators to conclude incorrectly that income flows from migrants rarely result in investment in productive, developmental, employment-generating enterprises in the village. (See Lipton's 1980 review of the remittance literature.)

Another methodological lesson learned from field experience is that many respondents overlook in-remittances in reporting income unless the income question explicitly asks respondents to include all such flows in their estimates of total income.

These comments about the limitations of most measures of remittance flows are intended to caution readers against the uncritical acceptance of results presented in many migration studies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the complex methodological issue of how to collect adequate data on remittances. But a manual recently produced by the International Labour Office (Standing, 1981) discusses in detail important issues relating to measuring income transfers and remittances. And Corner (1981) makes several useful comments about the collection of remittance data.

TYPES OF MOBILITY AND REMITTANCES

In Indonesia, as in much of the Third World, there has been in the last decade or so a great increase in the personal mobility of a wide spectrum of the population, especially of people living in rural areas. This change has been facilitated by a virtual revolution in the provision of public transport, especially road transport, over much of the country, particularly in Java (Hugo, 1981a). There has been a great increase in the volume of commuting, circular migration, and seasonal migration (Hugo, 1981b). The bulk of this mobility, however, goes unrecorded in censuses and large-scale demographic surveys, which routinely adopt definitional criteria and questions long used in migration data collection in Western countries to detect predominantly long-distance and more or less permanent changes in usual place of residence (Hugo, 1975, 1981c).

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1. For example, in a village I studied in West Java a respondent had just returned from visiting a cousin in Jakarta. Although the cousin had not seen the villager for a year or so before the visit, he gave him money to help him through a full season because the villager's rice crop had been ruined by flooding (Hugo, 1978:267).

The new mobility in Indonesia and elsewhere has important implications for wealth flows between movers and their families at the place of origin, because it has made available new options for generating such flows. The area over which members of a family can range in search of income opportunities, while not having to migrate permanently away from their home village, has considerably increased. Not only has this development encouraged more rural people to move and earn income outside the village, but also those who do move can return to the village more frequently and maintain other origin-destination linkages more readily than was previously the case. The remittance literature is preoccupied with migrants who migrate more or less permanently away from their places of origin. In general the literature differentiates between migrants crossing international boundaries and those moving within countries. Hence, Connell et al. (1976: 91) state that "international migration, both because it involves high initial costs and because it produces greater returns, records the highest rates of remittance."

Throughout Asia international worker migration, especially to the Middle East, has undergone a dramatic change in level, character, and socioeconomic implications in recent years. A major feature of this migration has been the high rates of return of the worker migrants and the high proportions of their income remitted to the home country (Hugo, 1981e; Keeley, 1980).

The question arises as to whether the conclusions about the benefits of international migration[2] can be extended to migration within a nation (Griffin, 1976:359). Lipton (1977), among others, has argued that such generalizations have been indiscriminate.

> The myth of huge urban-rural remittances, even net of reverse flows, may stem from false analogies with workseeking *international* migration. Turkish workers in Germany, Indians and Pakistanis in Britain and Algerians in France indeed remit large sums to their families in their countries of origin—but mainly to urban areas (Lipton, 1977:400).

In most studies of internal migration in which the investigators (e.g., Connell et al., 1976; Lipton, 1977, 1980; and Rempel and Lobdell, 1978) have reviewed remittance patterns, the patterns of migration

2. Remittances are only one aspect of the relationships between countries established by worker migration. Several authors (e.g., Bohning, 1975) have spelled out the negative, exploitative effects of worker migration and the dependency and international inequalities that it preserves.

are not at all comparable with those of international worker migration. Most international worker migrants move temporarily for a fixed period and have a definite commitment to return to their places of origin. Many leave in their places of origin their families of procreation (i.e., spouse and children) as well as their wider families, so that most of their long-term social, cultural, and economic commitments remain in the place of origin. The internal migrants described in the studies reviewed by the authors mentioned above tended to settle at the destination place. Because most of those studies were based upon household surveys using conventional sampling strategies, they had a bias toward the selection of migrants who moved with other family members and therefore made a relatively permanent commitment to staying at their destinations. Although many of such migrants have significant links with their places of origin, they usually have substantial and unavoidable financial commitments at their destinations, so that the amounts left over for remitting are small. Their situation contrasts with that of the international guestworkers, whose fixed costs at the destination are much smaller because dependent family members do not accompany them, and whose accommodation is often in barrack-type structures provided by employers. Thus the pattern of remittances tends to be quite different among international and internal migrants.

In much of the Third World the more or less permanent, longer-distance internal migration studied by means of conventional surveys and censuses is only one subset—and often not the largest or most significant subset in its economic and social impact—of total population mobility. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Goldstein [1978].) In an intensive study of 14 villages in West Java (Hugo, 1975, 1978) I found that out-movement from village to urban areas and to other rural localities took several distinctive forms and that these forms had important implications for the volume, frequency, and significance of remittances. Table 1 presents a typology of the population mobility identified as occurring on a substantial scale between village and city in the West Java-Jakarta region. The various types of moves can be distinguished by the degree and type of commitment that movers maintain with their places of origin and establish at their destinations. In the extent to which movers leave their families of procreation behind in the village, invest economically in the village, and maintain political and social roles in the village, the types of movement

TABLE 1. A preliminary typology of rural-to-urban population mobility in Third World societies
(Based on West Java)

Type of mover	Characteristics of mover	Commitment to city	Commitment to village
Commuter	Works in city but returns to village each evening. May commute regularly (each weekday) or spasmodically (to market produce, etc.).	Little financial or social investment in city. Mixes with urban dwellers but on a limited basis.	High. Family of procreation remains in the village. Retains all political and social roles in village. May have village-based income source. Bulk of income earned in city spent in village.
Seasonal or shuttle migrant	Searches for work to augment meager agricultural income.	Little financial or social investment in city. Sleeps in group-rented room or employer-provided barracks. Social interaction almost entirely with other migrants from village. Employment in traditional or day-laboring sectors.	Family of procreation remains in the village. Retains all political and social roles in village. Remits bulk of income (after living expenses) to village. Retains village citizenship. Almost total orientation to village. Usually retains work source in the village.
Short-term sojourner: Target migrant	Comes to city for limited period (though longer than a season) to accomplish a specific purpose (e.g., reach a particular educational level).	Moderate. May bring family of procreation. Seeks more permanent accommodation (e.g., individually rented room). Has more interaction with settled urban population but retains close contact with fellow villagers in city. Usually employed in traditional sector.	Maintains strong links with family in village through visits and letters, although some roles may be temporarily given up. Remittances remain regular and high. Usually retains village citizenship. Usually retains a source of income in the village.
Short-term sojourner: Life-cycle-stage migrant	Moves to the city at one or more specific stages of the life cycle.		

Working-life migrant	Spends entire working life in the city but intends to, and eventually does, retire to home village.	High. Family of procreation always accompanies. Purchases or builds individual housing, occupies employer- (e.g., government-) supplied housing or rents housing on a long-term basis. Often in a formal-sector occupation. Has high level of interaction with settled urban population but retains contact with fellow migrants through associations. Always transfers citizenship to the city. Assists new arrivals to city from home village.	Maintains sufficient links with village to ensure acceptance on eventual return. Makes investments in village housing and land, although unable to maintain most social and political roles. Sends periodic remittances to family. Makes return visits at end of fasting months and for important ceremonies.
Permanent migrant	Committed to exchanging a rural for an urban way of life.	Total.	Very little.
Undecided migrant	Has no clear intention to stay in the city or return to the village.	Unknown.	Unknown.

SOURCE: Adapted from Hugo (1983).

represent a continuum ranging from commuting through various types of circular, nonpermanent migration. All these elements influence the extent to which a mover feels obligated to remit money to his or her place of origin and also the individual's ability to remit, which is partly a function of the type and extent of commitment to the destination and hence the amount of fixed expenditure at the destination that is not available for remittance.

It can be seen from Table 1 that in many fundamental respects, especially the nature and degree of commitment to origin and destination, commuters and circular migrants (especially those whose moves are relatively short-term—i.e., seasonal, target, and life-cycle-stage migrants) have distinct similarities to the international temporary worker migrants mentioned earlier. Although it may be drawing a false analogy to compare international guestworkers to more or less permanent rural-to-urban migrants, this may not be the case for temporary internal population movers. Fan and Stretton (1980:23), in their consideration of circular migration in Southeast Asia, concluded: "From the point of view of the rural sector, remittances represent an important benefit of circular migration. While permanent migrants may also send funds to the village, the amounts are unlikely to be as large or regular." The West Java case study supports the contention that the net remittances of nonpermanent migrants are substantially greater and more significant than those of permanent migrants.

An important point to stress is that most of this temporary mobility is not detected in conventional household surveys, which means that remittances are severely underestimated in such surveys. An example of such underreporting occurs in the findings (Temple, 1975; Suharso et al., 1976) of a large-scale study that was conducted in Jakarta and other Indonesian urban centers at the same time as the West Java study referred to above. The study used household registers as a sampling frame and hence could include only migrants who had established a more or less permanent household in the city and who had officially changed their identification cards to indicate a Jakarta address. The study excluded all commuters and most circular migrants, since the latter tend to remain registered officially at their villages of origin and while in the city to sleep in barracks, in unfinished buildings, at their workplaces, with friends, or in the open rather than to own or rent urban-based permanent lodging. Of the 9,902 males included in the study, 34 percent were students, as were 24 percent of

the 6,829 females, and they could not be expected to remit income to their villages of origin. The study found that about one in six migrants interviewed had sent money back to his or her village during the 12 months prior to the interview.

In contrast, urban-based studies carefully designed so as not to exclude circular migrants have revealed the importance of such migrants' remittances. Jellinek (1978), for example, in her study of more than 200 petty mobile traders in Jakarta, found that all but one was a circular migrant and that they were usually able to set aside up to a half of their city earnings to send back to the village. Her study thus provides urban-end support to the findings of the West Java village study that temporary migration is occurring on a substantial scale and that the rural-urban remittances initiated by this movement are significant.

Survey design and methodology are only one reason why migration studies have excluded temporary migrants from analyses of remittances. Another reason, at least in Indonesia, is that, although temporary mobility patterns have a long history in that country (see Hugo, 1981d), the huge scale of temporary migration is relatively recent. Thus studies initiated a decade or so ago may have overlooked it. This point is important in that most of the studies quoted to support the case that remittances are of little significance in the rural sector are based on fieldwork carried out more than a decade ago. Perhaps the most widely quoted data (especially by Lipton, 1980) are those derived from 40 Indian studies conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which are analyzed in Connell et al. (1976). The applicability of such data two decades later is open to question, especially in the light of information in later studies (e.g., Kothari, 1980; Oberai and Singh, 1980).

The intention of the last two sections of this paper has not been to provide support for either side of the controversy over the net costs and benefits of migration to regions of out-migration in the Third World, but rather to indicate how difficult it is to assess the significance of income flows between movers and their families. It is difficult both because the remittance data themselves are frequently suspect and because much of the population mobility that gives rise to remittance flows is not included within the scope of many studies.

THE DETERMINANTS OF REMITTANCE FLOWS

The term used by Weisner (1972) in the title of his thesis concerned with rural-urban linkages in Kenya, "One Family, Two Households," is acutely evocative of the strong links that movers often maintain with their households of origin and that are critical determinants of the scale, regularity, nature, and size of remittance flows. The remittance literature suggests that whether or not remittances are sent, and the size and nature of remittances, are largely a function of (1) the nature of the mobility (temporary versus permanent, family versus individual, etc.); (2) the level and nature of the commitment felt by the mover to those left behind; (3) the amount of control that those left behind can exercise over the mover; (4) links maintained between mover and the family; (5) the level and nature of the needs of the migrant and the village kin; and (6) the type of employment, income, and living costs of the migrant. In these determinants the family clearly has a central role.

In some cases population mobility may be a direct outcome of a decision made within the family to spread the family's labor resources over a wider area than the home village.

> . . . the family as the subsistence unit assigns different roles in the family labor force to its members; determines differential access to family resources on the basis of kinship, age, title and other characteristics; attempts to exploit all available resources that sometimes include an external labor market; and determines the rules for passing on family holdings. The role assigned to an individual by the family in fulfilling these functions will inevitably be important in determining the relative motivation and incentive to migrate (Harbison, 1981:241).

In situations where the family makes a deliberate spatial allocation of its labor resources and makes decisions that involve separating one or more members from the home base, significant remittances usually result. Connell (1981:234) makes a useful distinction between two types of migration: "individual" where the decision to move is independent of kinship needs and obligations, and "linked" where the migration involves specific obligatory ties, usually financial, with kin in the village. The distinction is not a clear one, because the degree of commitment and linkage to home among movers in the Third World tends to occur along a continuum, as the typology in Table 1 suggests. But the size and frequency of remittances tend to be positively related to the extent of commitment or linkage between mover and village-based family.

Connell (1980:7–8) quotes several case studies in the Pacific, where the head of the nuclear family has responsibility for committing labor—not only within the home area, but also as far away as New Zealand, from where family members will send money back to the family on the home island. Similarly, Connell quotes (p. 8) evidence in India of this expansion of family income-earning opportunities developing "into a well organized and more permanent allocation of family resources, in terms of both time and finance." Kothari (1980:268), in his study of out-migration from four Rajasthani villages, notes that an individual's decision to migrate was often influenced by other household members, especially parents. Desai (1955:114) maintained that migration from Indian rural areas is "family oriented" rather than "individual oriented," so that the individual does not "come to the city to carve out his own future but to maintain the joint family at home." Srinivas (1966:138) observed that many Indian urban households are "satellites" of a joint family in a village several hundred miles away. Epstein (1973:207–9) found in her study of two South Indian villages that a "share family" type of arrangement exists, whereby family members are geographically dispersed but maintain such a level of contact that important decisions are taken jointly so that the welfare of the group is maximized. Davis (1951:108) suggested that a major factor inhibiting migration in India is the existence of the joint family system, where, in virtually all aspects of life, members of the family have definite roles that are assigned by the head of the family, who has absolute power over them.

Kothari (1980:299–302) has given the conventional explanation of why the joint family inhibits spatial mobility:

> . . . first, members of joint families, because of the obligations they have toward other members, cannot move freely even if opportunities are available elsewhere; second, there is a fear that joint family identification will not be retained once a member leaves the family; and third, since the older generation has absolute authority the traditional thinking of family elders restricts the actions of young people.

His findings, however, together with those from other field studies mentioned earlier, suggest that the opposite is the case—that the institution of a joint family enhances rather than hinders mobility. Kothari argues that such a family is in a better position to provide economic, social, and psychological support for migration in both normal and critical times and that, because the family exercises power over its

members, remittances from urban employment are substantial and often increase the viability of the joint family in the village.

The fact that migration often occurs for the sake of the family, rather than the individual, may have an interesting bearing on family size in Third World societies. There are indications in the literature that family members who are asked to participate in income-earning activities away from the home village come disproportionately from particular positions within the family. Connell et al. (1976:46) refer to a number of studies that found birth order to be important in determining who in the family migrates, the choice depending upon the inheritance rules of the society. Kasdan (1964:35) suggests that male primogeniture increases the probability that younger sons will migrate. Wyon and Gordon (1971) found in the Punjab village they studied that parents kept older sons out of school to train them to take over the family's land holding, whereas younger sons were encouraged to stay at school in preparation for migration. Kothari (1980:282) found that first-born Rajasthani sons were the least mobile.

It appears obvious then that if there are perceived opportunities for the family to maintain or lift its level of consumption or savings by sending family members off to earn in more distant localities, it is not necessarily disadvantageous (and it may even be advantageous) to have a family size in excess of that required to maintain productivity in village-based activities. Some studies in India, where the joint family system is entrenched, suggest that this is the case. Lipton (1980:13) summarizes the Indian evidence thus: ". . . like the propensity to migrate, remittances per migrant seem to increase with the size of the nuclear family." Kothari (1980:306) found that large families appeared to have a deliberate strategy for diversifying their portfolios of human capital by financing investment in the migration of a family member; the expected return on that investment included future remittances. Hence migration occurred to a greater extent out of large families than out of smaller ones in which the option of migration was less available.

Large families also tend to benefit more from remittances than small families. Hence within pretransitional societies enhanced population mobility may serve to maintain stable high fertility levels by increasing the area over which the family can deploy its labor resources. Hamdani (1972:44) observes that in the several Indian villages he studied, increased population movement (most of it circular in na-

ture) to cities ensured that the larger families of the villages were better off than smaller families; it thus contributed to a maintenance of stable high fertility.

Stark (1979:245) makes the important observation that "the migrating agent and the decision making unit no longer need coincide" in the Third World. Evidence for this view is Kothari's (1980:338) finding that for a quarter of the out-migrants in his Rajasthani village study the decision to move was made by the mover's father alone. Stark asserts that conventional models of rural-to-urban migration are based on the premise that migration is a consequence of individuals' decisions to maximize their expected income. However, when the decision-making unit is the village-based family or its head, the aim is often to maximize the family's or parents' expected income by means of the migrant's remittances and to ensure that the net lifetime balance of intergenerational wealth transfers remains heavily in favor of the parents. To this end the family may initially provide the individual mover with funds to enable him or her to move and become established at the destination.

Knowles and Anker (1977:3) have suggested that in studies of wealth flows the associated importance of population mobility is so great that the basic unit of study should not be the de facto household resident at the time of a survey but rather what they call the "economic" household. This is in essence a type of de jure household that includes not only persons resident at the time of survey but also heads of household absent and seeking work, dependent students attending school away from home, and children employed away from home but still contributing the bulk of their incomes to the rural household. They defined a person residing away from home as a member of the household if that person either received from or contributed to the household more than half of her or his income.

In many communities of developing societies the real motivation for moving out of the village is not an individual's desire for personal social and economic upward mobility but the need to support a village-based family. For example, Vredenbregt (1964:132), in a study of the highly mobile Bawean people, many of whom had moved from their small island (off the coast of Java) to Singapore, found that

> . . . *merantau* to Singapore was undertaken with the aim of making enough money to support the stay-at-homes. This type of financial aid . . . assumes two forms: individual aid by sending money or goods to relatives on Bawean,

> and collective aid by a *pondok* community in Singapore to its eponymous *desa* (village) on Bawean. [A Bawean *pondok* in Singapore consists of one or more houses in which the Bawean from one common *desa* live together.]

Similarly, Desai (1955:114) concluded that in India "the individual does not come to the city to carve out his own future but to maintain a joint family at home." In some societies, therefore, a fundamental initiating force in mobility is the need to meet kinship obligations by sending remittances back to the family.

In the West Java study (Hugo, 1975, 1978) I found that the reason for most circular migration and commuting (the major types of rural-urban mobility found within the study area) was to bring back income to the village. Such moves were perceived by those I interviewed almost wholly as a means to enhance the income of the village-based family. In West Java it would seem useful to amend Connell's (1981) distinction between "individual" and "linked" migrants by subdividing the latter into those whose links with the place of origin are through his family of procreation left behind and those whose links are through other family and local ties. The distinction suggests different levels of commitment to the village and motivation to remit on the part of temporary migrants (a great majority of whom are men), as well as the extent to which remittances are inter- and intragenerational.

The West Java findings illustrate how the type of mobility influences whether remittances will occur, and if so, their scale. Virtually all working commuters and circular migrants remit money to their village-based families. In most West Javan villages the nuclear family (*keluarga batih*) is the "unit of most decisions about consumption, savings and investment and the unit of most production (Palmer, 1967:315). Hence unmarried temporary migrants remit money mainly to their parents in the village, whereas married temporary migrants send or bring most of their money to wives and children. My data revealed that 22.7 percent of all remittances from circular migrants went to their families of origin and the bulk of the remainder to families of procreation.

Since most permanent migrants to urban areas from the West Javan villages (the study's temporal criterion of permanent migration was absence from the village for at least six months) tend to be accompanied by their families of procreation, one would expect them to remit fewer goods and less money to their villages than temporary

migrants. Even after marriage, however, most West Javans feel a strong obligation to their parents, especially during the parents' old age when, because pension schemes are not widely available, children are responsible for the support of parents no longer able to work. Moreover, bonds of filial loyalty are so strong that many working migrants remit money and goods to parents who are still economically active. In my study area 52 percent of all permanent rural-to-urban migrants had brought or sent money to their parents in the year prior to the survey, while 62 percent had sent or brought goods. A substantial number of the permanent migrants were students and other economically inactive persons who were unable to remit money. If they are excluded, some 95 percent of permanent migrants in the urban workforce remitted money to their parents in the year prior to the survey. In addition to regular remitting to their families of origin, migrants in the city are occasionally called upon in emergencies to help their wider families (*golongan*).

The flow of remittances between village and city initiated by permanent and long-term rural-to-urban migration is not one-way. In West Java the costs incurred by circular migrants and commuters for travel, and for survival in the city before a job was found, were much less than those incurred by permanent migrants and were quickly compensated for by earnings in the city. However, possibly in part because of the higher initial costs incurred by permanent migrants, 21 percent of those surveyed in West Javan cities reported having received regular remittances from their village families. Most recipients of cash were students whose tuition and living costs were met by their parents. Lipton (1980:13) reports that in India the level of out-remittances from a village is strongly related to the number of student out-migrants. A common practice in West Java is for migrants returning from a village visit to bring substantial amounts of agricultural produce (especially rice and other foodstuffs) in with them. Some investigators have argued that these out-remittances from villages are generally greater in value than remittances received from the city (Amin, 1974; Lipton, 1977; Simmons et al., 1977; Connell et al., 1976), but this was not the case in the West Java study or in many recent careful village studies. Oberai and Singh (1980:235), for example, found in their study of 2,124 households in the Indian Punjab that the volume of remittances to out-migrants was negligible when compared with the in-flow of remittances from them.

The sharing of wealth between movers and those who remain in the village of origin is the result of a complex pattern of social and economic obligations that are usually family based and are not necessarily broken or weakened because family members are dispersed. An interrelationship clearly exists between the attitudes of family members (especially the head) toward out-movement from the village and the family's need for, and expectations of, remittances; but this determinant of population mobility has not been addressed to any great extent in the literature.

A critical factor in all of the above is the extent to which the village-based family (especially the parents) can establish and maintain control over members who are spatially separated from them so that net wealth transfers from children to parents are maintained. Within the village community there are usually various traditional mechanisms for exercising this control. In West Java, for example, village communities are characterized by complex patterns of reciprocal obligations and ties between and within families and generations, along which wealth flows are channeled. These relationships and flows are regulated by *adat*—the body of customary practice—which varies from area to area but has some common elements. *Adat* regulates and provides guidelines for most day-to-day activities in the village, including wealth transfers.

One important set of ties is associated with the family; these ties are particularly strong in West Java. The closest links are within the *keluarga batih* (nuclear family consisting of husband, wife, and unmarried children[3]), but ties are also maintained with a wider kindred group (*golongan*). Between the *keluarga batih* and the *golongan* exist strong mutual obligations. Loyalty to family is one of the most fundamental characteristics of the Sundanese inhabitants of West Java. It distinguishes them somewhat from the Javanese, whose local loyalties seem more territorial in nature. The strength of Sundanese family ties is encapsulated in a frequently heard Sundanese proverb (which, incidentally, has its equivalent in proverbs of several other ethnic

3. Palmer (1967:314–15), however, states that the *keluarga batih* often includes other relatives and even servants, and that it is "constantly changing as relatives come to stay after sickness or economic hardship in the city, sons-in-law move in temporarily at marriage, married daughters come home to bear their children or return after divorce, and children of a child or sibling or more distant relatives join the household for a period of from days to years."

groups:[4] "*Bengkung ngariung bongkok ngaronyok, kacai jadi saleuwi kedarat jade salongah*" ("So long as the family is together everything is good, no matter what the economic circumstances"). The Sundanese feel loyalty and ties to their *kampung halaman, kampung keluarga,* or *tanah kelahiran*—the section of the village in which they were born, where their family lives and has lived for a long time. They do not have strong ties with the locality as such, but rather indirectly through its role as the traditional home of the family. I know of no studies that have attempted to measure the wealth flows that are channeled along the strong ties between members of the *keluarga batih.* It is clear from field observation, however, as well as from anthropological work among the Sundanese (e.g., Palmer, 1959, 1967; Harsojo, 1971), that the flows are substantial and the obligation to see to the welfare of parents and other members of the *keluarga batih* is strongly perceived and reinforced by *adat* (customary law). Net intergenerational wealth flows, at least among the poor and middle-income landless and small holding groups, are very much in favor of parents. Although the Sundanese feel an obligation to provide regularly for parents, they also know they can approach the wider *golongan* family for assistance in time of need. Harsojo (1971:318), for example, states that when a relative in one's *golongan* is living in another city or village, one can always beg assistance from him in time of need. There is as yet little evidence of a weakening of these obligations and ties between members of the *keluarga batih* and *golongan* with migration out of the hearth area.

A second type of intracommunity tie that initiates wealth flows—although it is less likely to be intergenerational—is the traditional authority relationship. Palmer (1959:42–43) explains that the Sundanese have traditionally emphasized loyalty to superiors both within and outside the family. In West Java traditional authority networks known as *bapak-anak buah* relationships have long been widespread. Jackson and Moeliono (1973:18–19) explain the system thus:

> . . . the father (*bapak*) of the group accumulates authority by building what in effect is an extended family which he is able to command and for which

4. For example, Mantra (1981:145) reports the same proverb and close family ties among the Javanese; and Rambe (1977:29), in discussing the close family ties among the Banjarese, quotes the following popular proverb: "Although it may rain gold in another country and stones in our area, we will still live in our village of birth" (my translation).

> he must assume diffuse responsibilities. The *bapak* forms relations with his *anak buah* (children) by assuming responsibility for their spiritual, material and social needs.

Thus there may be flows of wealth from *bapak* to *anak buah* involving provision of access to agricultural land or employment as a share-cropper or wage laborer, providing the offspring with money, food, etc., during unpredictable calamities such as drought, providing money for ceremonies, to pay off money lenders, and for other special needs. In return, the *anak buah* may repay the debts incurred but the main debt owed the *bapak* is a moral obligation (*hutang budi*). The benefits to the *bapak* are hence not necessarily or even usually financial but are associated with increased status in the village. The extent to which these flows are intergenerational and interfamily has not been explicitly investigated, but intragenerational flows seem to be dominant.

The final set of intravillage linkages involving wealth flows in West Java is that usually referred to as *gotong rojong*—the concepts and practices related to mutual assistance and cooperation felt within groups of people in the village. Hofsteede (1971:55) explains that its two basic principles are reciprocity and equality; it is a system for mobilizing local resources to sustain poor families in time of economic stress and in expediting such tasks as harvesting and road construction, and it has a strong socio-psychological supportive role.

These are the major types of obligations and linkages within West Javan village communities along which wealth flows occur. They have been little studied and their wealth-flows aspect totally neglected. Nevertheless, it is apparent that such flows are substantial and also that most of them are maintained after migration occurs. In West Java however, as in many other Third World regions mentioned in this review, the high level of population movement out of villages is a recent phenomenon. Most movers are thus very close to their village origins, so that the strain placed on village-based obligations and ties by the mover's absence presumably is not so great as when the mover has been separated from the village for many years. Field evidence suggests that remittances from permanent migrants tend to fall off sharply over time (Connell, 1981). Among temporary migrants of various types, however, the constant movement to and from the home place usually serves to reinforce the traditional ties and bonds between mover and village-based family. Hence, as long as temporary

migration remains dominant, it is likely that the net intergenerational wealth transfers in favor of parents will be maintained.

Some writers (e.g., Skeldon, 1977; Maude, 1980; Nelson, 1978) have suggested that this temporary migration represents a transitionary phase and that with further economic and social change mobility will gradually become more permanent in nature. It is perhaps too early to judge whether such an evolutionary sequence will occur in West Java, but at least at present temporary movers appear to have a strong long-term commitment to a bilocality that combines activity in both urban and rural areas. Should much of the circular migration and commuting be transformed into permanent migration, it would certainly result in a reduction in wealth flows to village-based families.

THE PREVALENCE OF REMITTANCES

Connell et al. (1976:91) suggest that there is a steady decline in both the absolute size of remittances and the proportion they make up of migrant earnings as one moves from international to townward to rural-rural migration. In this paper I have argued that it is less the nature of the destination than the commitment of the mover to the destination and the resultant degree of permanence of the move that influences wealth flows. Rempel and Lobdell (1978:333) conclude from their review of the literature that "the proportion of urban income remitted varies directly with the strength of social and economic ties to the rural area, and inversely with how well migrants are established in urban areas." Many of the case studies from Africa, India, the Pacific, and Southeast Asia indicate that, in comparison with income earned, the proportion of money and resources remitted is substantial.

In my West Java study (Hugo, 1978:265) all temporary migrants brought back money to the village when they returned, 81 percent brought back goods, and 74 percent sent money back to the village between their return visits. Overall in the survey villages remittances from circular migrants averaged one every six weeks. Among circular migrants from villages in Jakarta an average of 57 percent of weekly incomes was spent on urban-based living expenses, 11 percent on travel to and from the village, and 32 percent on remittances to the village. The average weekly earnings of these movers were very low (around US $6.00 at the time of survey in 1973) both in absolute

terms and relative to earnings of permanent Jakarta residents (estimated in 1972 to be around US $9.50 per week [Papanek, 1975]). Most circular migrants endure absolutely minimal living conditions in the city in order to maximize the amount remitted and the frequency with which they can return to the village. Among migrants from the 14 villages studied, the proportion of Jakarta-earned income remitted ranged from 21 to 44 percent, the highest rates being among those earning higher average incomes.

Among permanent migrants in Jakarta, remittances accounted for 10 percent of their total urban incomes on average. Although these remittance rates were lower than those of temporary migrants, the finding that the incomes of permanent migrants tended to be both greater and more secure means that this level of remittance represented a substantial flow to the villages. The proportion is especially impressive when it is considered that the bulk of the flow is directed toward relatives other than the family of procreation.

It is perhaps more meaningful to examine the importance of remittances in the migrant's place of origin. In West Java I observed a close relationship between the type of mobility (commuting, short-term circular migration, or permanent migration) and the relative importance of remittances from the mover in the total income of the household of origin. Table 2 shows that remittances have the greatest relative importance in commuter households, making up 60 percent on average of their total income. This is because there is little seasonal or daily fluctuation in rates of rural-urban commuting and most commuters are employed more or less full time in urban areas. Circular migration is more subject to seasonal fluctuations than commuting, so that urban participation is more intermittent and on average the contribution of remittances to village household income is smaller. But remittances from circular migrants in urban areas still account for nearly half of the total income in their households of origin. Four-fifths of the remittances involve cash flows. Noncash remittances are a frequently overlooked economic benefit accruing to villages as a result of migration, but in West Java their average value in the year before the survey was rupiah (Rp) 12,200 per circular migrant whereas average cash remittances were Rp 49,700. (One Rp was equal to US $0.042 at the time of the survey.) The overall predominance of cash remittances from circular migrants, however, points to the main function of urban income in the village: to permit the purchase, at lower

TABLE 2. Contribution of remittances from commuters, circular migrants, and permanent migrants in urban areas to the income of their households of origin in West Javan survey villages: July 1972 to June 1973
(In thousands of rupiah)

Item	Commuters	Circular migrants	Permanent migrants
Number of respondents	193	463	411
Household income			
Mean	184.4	129.9	171.9
Intervillage range	72–354	83–239	102–272
Remittances received			
Mean	111	61.9	13.7
Intervillage range	25–145	27–88	8–20
Remittances as % of household income			
Mean	60.2	47.7	8.0
Intervillage range	24–91	16–69	4–14

NOTE: US $1 = Rp 420 at time of survey. Households may have included one or more movers.

SOURCE: Hugo (1978:268–72).

prices than in the city, of the basic necessities of life, such as food and clothing. In the poorer villages I studied higher proportions of remittances consisted of cash than of goods. In the poorest villages remittances also accounted for the largest proportions of household income. In fact, there was a significant inverse relationship (Rho = −0.69) between the average annual income of mover households and the proportion of the income that was made up of remittances.

Table 2 supports the hypothesis that village households sending permanent migrants to urban areas have substantially higher average annual incomes than those sending circular migrants. But in West Java the contribution of permanent migrants' remittances to village income was only one-sixth that of circular migrants. A major reason is that nearly half of the permanent migrants were not in the workforce and had no income to remit. Even among households with working permanent migrants in the city, however, the average proportion of income consisting of remittances was only one-third that of circular migrants. Nevertheless, when one considers that, unlike circular migrants, many

permanent migrants support their family of procreation in the city, the sums remitted to the villages are substantial. A larger proportion of permanent migrants' remittances (50 percent) consisted of goods and gifts than was the case for remittances from circular migrants (20 percent). An inverse relationship (Rho = −0.71) existed between the average annual income of permanent migrants' households of origin and the proportion of that income consisting of remittances. Hence, as with village households of circular migrants, among those of permanent migrants it was the poorer ones that relied most upon remittances for survival.

Unfortunately, few migration studies in Indonesia have collected detailed remittance data, and therefore it is difficult to judge the extent to which the findings of the West Java study can be generalized. Jellinek (1978) found that the circular migrant traders she interviewed in Jakarta were usually able to set aside up to half of their earnings to send back to their villages. She comments thus concerning the effect of the remittances in the villages:

> . . . for those villages which do send circular migrants to the city, the financial impact may be quite significant, even when only a small proportion of the menfolk take part. This becomes evident when one compares the annual grant made by the Indonesian government to the villages for development purposes with the amount of money taken back to the village by just one circular migrant. In 1975 the so-called Inpres grant to every village amounted to Rp 200,000 per annum. . . . One ice-cream seller of middling ability could send back more than half this amount to his village each year. In villages with not one but fifty or more circular migrants, the amount of money brought back to the village must have been much more substantial than any other source of village income (Jellinek, 1978:7–8).

Critchfield's (1970) study of a Jakarta pedicab driver also details the importance of remittances from the city to the rural home area. Suharso et al. (1976) found that one in six migrants in Indonesian cities remitted money to their villages; excluding student migrants, the proportion was one in four. Naim (1974) reported that migrants from West Sumatra not only sent remittances to their village families but also formed themselves into associations at their places of destination and sent funds to their home villages for village development projects. He explained that it is widely acknowledged among migrants all over Indonesia that it is their duty to "help sustain things going on in the village" (Naim, 1974:304). He found the wealth flows from migrants to their village-based families to be considerable, with much

of the money being sent expressly to support parents (Naim, 1974: 309). Naim has suggested (p. 309) that part of the long-established tradition of *merantau* (out-migration) from West Sumatra is that migrants leave "always with the idea of bringing home everything they earned in *rantau*" (the destination). This tradition, however, has undergone some modification since Maude (1975) found in his study of 11 West Sumatran villages that the proportion of households in those villages that relied to any extent on remittances for household income ranged from 0 to 73 percent.

Naim (1974:315) has also raised the issue of ethnic differences in the propensity to remit. Whereas there is a strong tradition for, and obligation upon, West Sumatran migrants to send money back to their natal village, this does not apply to most Batak people in North Sumatra. Similarly, Siegel (1969:166), in a study of the Acehnese in the northernmost province in Sumatra, reported that

> they [the Acehnese] ridicule the Minangkabau for sending money back to their villages when they could use it for trade. The Minangkabau, said one trader, "are outmoded. They send money home instead of keeping it for business."

In South Sulawesi Forbes (1978:229) found that one-third of the Makassarese trishaw drivers he interviewed in Ujung Pandang sent money back to their home villages, usually to wives and parents and on a monthly basis. According to Mangunrai (1979), Torajan migrants from the mountainous interior of the province remit money home from their destinations, especially the city of Ujung Pandang. Crystal (1974:133) and Forbes (1976:8–9) have indicated that these remittances are an important element in agricultural development in the home village. The money sent back to families is used for four main purposes—to purchase rice fields, to buy buffalo and pigs, to construct elaborate and ornate wooden houses, and for ceremonial use. Rumbiak (1978:57), in his study of the migration of Genyem people in Irian Jaya to the provincial capital of Jayapura, found that most migrants remitted money to their home villages, the bulk of remittances going to families of origin. He emphasized the influence of customary law (*adat*) on the level of remittances. *Adat* in this area makes it imperative that a migrant send remittances to the home village; not to do so when one arrives at the destination is to defy *adat* and could lead to social sanctions against the migrant.

A question having an important bearing on the topic of this paper

is: Who in the village receives and has control over the remittances sent back by movers? Unfortunately, most studies do not include a detailed analysis of the relationship between the recipients of remittances and the sender. In my West Java study some four-fifths of temporary movers' remittances were sent to the nuclear family of procreation for its maintenance, since almost all such movers had left their wives and children in the village. Nevertheless, one-fifth of the remittances from these movers were remitted to parents and thus represented a substantial upward intergenerational wealth flow. Such intergenerational transfers were predominant in the flows from permanent migrants to their villages of origin.

Similar patterns of dominant child-to-parent flows have been reported in much of the African literature. Riddell (1970:68) found in his Liberian study that in 132 circular labor migration trips recorded, migrants made 100 cash transactions with members of their families, 60 percent of the transactions involving the father, 30 percent wives, and 10 percent other kin or a combination of the first two. Knowles and Anker (1977:4–7) concluded in their study of remittances in Kenya that, although the average amount transferred was greatest for transfers involving members of the mover's own nuclear family (i.e., wives, sons, and daughters), there was evidence that children were an important source of support for parents. Their analysis, which was based on the de jure "economic household" discussed earlier, indicated that, of the transfers sent by household heads, the proportions received by their parents were 21.2 percent in the case of migrant heads resident in urban areas and 33.6 percent from heads residing in rural localities. In addition, among sons and daughters in these "economic households," parents accounted for 48.9 percent of remittances sent from urban areas and 30.3 percent of those sent from rural areas.

In the Indian literature, the study by Oberai and Singh (1980) in the Punjab shows that upward intergenerational wealth flows were dominant among 395 of a total of 697 out-migrants they studied who had ever remitted (p. 231). In fact, nearly three-quarters of all remittances were directed toward the parents or parents-in-law of migrants. Kothari (1980:289) reported that in Rajasthan 97 percent of households from which migrants had left received remittances, so that every second household in the sample villages had a double source of income—from family members working in the village and from those of

its members who worked outside the village. Kothari found that the remittances were usually sent to the father or wife of the mover.

To sum up the prevalence of remittances, it is clear that in many parts of the Third World in-remittances constitute a major element in village income. These remittances are directed predominantly toward the family of procreation and the family of origin. Remittances to the latter are particularly meaningful because they involve, in Caldwell's (1976) terms, a cross-generational net upward flow of wealth from children to parents. Whether such patterns support high stable fertility levels in areas of out-migration is not clear from the literature, although Mamdani (1972:44) maintains that they do in India. The West Javan areas most influenced by population movement to Jakarta appear to have above-average fertility for Java.[5]

THE USE OF REMITTANCES

One aspect of the controversy in the migration literature over whether the impact of out-migration on rural areas is beneficial or harmful concerns the extent to which in-remittances are used for productive purposes in the village. Connell et al. (1976:98) concluded in their review of studies from Africa, India, and the Pacific that

> the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the spending of remittances reflects the poverty and lack of investment opportunities from which the migrant came. The majority of remittances are consumed in everyday household needs, or in conspicuous consumption.

This generalization was borne out in the West Javan study villages, where most remittances from temporary migrants were used to purchase the mundane necessities of life. The pattern was slightly different with remittances from longer-term and permanent migrants, however; only one-half (54 percent) of the recipients of such remittances used the monies to purchase rice (the staple food of the region),

5. Unfortunately, detailed fertility data were not collected as part of the 1973 West Javan survey (Hugo, 1975, 1978), but the survey data and birth registration data indicated that the villages with high rates of temporary out-migration had high fertility levels. Moreover, detailed analyses of Java's fertility done at about the same time as the field survey showed much higher fertility in West Java than elsewhere in Java and Bali. For example, McDonald et al. (1976:5) found that parity among women of ages 40–44 in 1973 was 1.5 children higher on average in West than in East Java. It is an interesting but unanswered research question whether the higher rates of temporary migration to cities in West Java are associated with the sharp regional fertility differentials.

although a considerably larger proportion (84 percent) bought other types of food.[6] Over half (56 percent) of households receiving remittances from permanent movers met educational expenses of siblings and children with remittance funds. This finding again suggests that permanent migrants tend to be drawn from the more prosperous households. Other nonsubsistence expenditures involved the mounting of ceremonies, especially those associated with life-cycle events such as circumcision and marriage (20 percent of recipients), whereas nearly half (49 percent) of recipient households purchased consumer goods such as pressure lanterns and radios. Only 6 percent of migrants' families of origin made use of remittances for development investment in land, property, or agriculture, although many of the migrants made such investments themselves. Out-remittances of money to permanent migrants in cities were almost entirely devoted to meeting the costs of putting children through educational institutions (Hugo, 1978:274).

Thus the evidence from West Java indicates that, especially in the poorer villages and households, most of the remittance income is used to purchase basic necessities such as food staples and that the purpose of population mobility for many is to help bridge the gap between *cukupan* (having enough)[7] and the income-earning possibilities in the home area. It was only in the more prosperous villages and households I studied that remittances were being used to buy nonsubsistence goods and education. It was thus critical to the welfare of many rural households that the remittances continue and access to urban employment be maintained.

These findings are supported by Jellinek's (1978) urban-end study. "The bulk of the *pondok* dweller's savings, perhaps as much as seventy per cent, went on the basic food needs of his family in the village" (Jellinek, 1978:6).

Oberai and Singh (1980:236–37) reported similar findings from their Punjab study: that three-quarters of households spent remit-

6. These data on remittance use are extremely limited. In practice the remittances may have freed for other purposes funds that would otherwise have been committed to the purchase of food. To investigate this question more fully one would have to compare consumption patterns of remittance recipients and nonrecipients or those of a household before and after the introduction of remittances.

7. This Indonesian term is widely used in Java to refer to how much income in rice equivalent is necessary for an individual to survive at a bare subsistence level.

tances on food and clothing; a quarter spent them on consumer goods; 10 percent used remittances for ceremonies; and only a small proportion (6 percent) used remittances for productive investment such as the purchase of agricultural equipment, land, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Oberai and Singh make the point, however, that although the overall pattern of expenditure appears to be consumption-oriented, it should not be viewed as being unproductive since, in an economy in which levels of living are low, consumption expenditure may be functional and induce significant improvements in labor productivity.

In a study in Southeastern Nigeria, Odimuko and Riddell (1979) found that 71.3 percent of sample households received remittances. A multiple regression analysis revealed that cash remittances had no apparent effect upon the general maintenance of rural households or upon expenditures on primary school education, but they were associated significantly with spending on secondary schooling. Odimuko and Riddell asserted that because the latter type of expenditure is closely related to rural youth out-migration it contributes to a continuation of existing rural-urban disparities.

Expenditure of in-remittances on education of children and siblings is a widespread practice (see, e.g., Corner, 1981:132); but in many cases, such as the West Javan villages, out-remittances for education are probably so large that the net wealth flows directly used to finance education are probably in a rural-to-urban direction. Such out-remittances, however, are seen in some contexts as a form of investment because education will assist children to obtain well-paid, urban-based occupations and enable them to remit money and goods to their families. For example, Knowles and Anker (1977:41) observed in Kenya a positive relationship between educational level and transfer level. They suggested that this finding is consistent with the use of income transfers to repay parents and other relatives for past educational expenses. Hence, a net wealth flow from village-based parents to an urban-based child will be balanced and perhaps even outweighed by a net flow in the reverse direction at a later stage in the life cycle.

That the bulk of remittances to the village are used for food, clothing, and other necessities is partly a reflection of the predominant causes of the migration itself—to maintain and perhaps enhance the welfare of the village-based family of procreation or family of origin. This is particularly so in Java, where many peasant and landless households live close to the margin of subsistence. Several intravillage

support systems involve wealth flows within and between families to ensure survival. These flows are governed by customary local practice (*adat*), which specifies not only mutual obligations between members of the nuclear family (*keluarga batih*) and the wider family (*golangan*), and between patron (*bapak*) and client (*anak buah*), but also mutual self-help among residents of a particular community (*gotong royong*). The resultant relationships and obligations act as a social insurance system in times of difficulty. *Adat* thus fosters some redistribution of village resources, but since the redistribution is directed toward the survival of poorer and disadvantaged groups rather than their upward mobility, the entrenched pattern of intravillage inequality is preserved. When these mutual obligations are extended through remittances beyond the village to resources located in towns, it is not surprising that the basic necessities predominate among remittance expenditures. In Java little is known about the extent to which migrants are maintaining traditional obligations and relationships or whether increased commercialization of agricultural activity is eroding the "shared poverty" aspects of *adat* within the village and hence encouraging greater out-migration among the poor.

The weight of evidence suggests that remittances are seldom used as investment for rural development. Investment tends to be restricted to construction and improvement of village houses, purchase of land, and education. Mitchell (1969:179) concludes in his study of labor migration in Africa that the mover faces a lifetime of family obligations in his home area and strives to conserve the existing situation in that area rather than attempt to transform its economy or social structure. The rural alternative is maintained in part by wealth flows, many of them intergenerational in an upward direction and essentially conservative of the village status quo in their effect. Thus migration in much of the Third World supports pretransitional wealth-flow patterns—that is, patterns characteristic of societies that have not yet experienced fertility decline.

INCOME-DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF REMITTANCES

It is somewhat surprising that in the substantial literature concerned with remittances there are few explicit or detailed analyses of their effects upon income distribution. Much of the importance, from a policy point of view, of migration-related wealth transfers stems from their potentially significant role in the redistribution of income both

spatially within a country and socially between classes. For example, Knowles and Anker (1977:1) note the possibility that an increased propensity to remit income to home areas among rural-to-urban migrants may have an income-redistributing effect similar to that of policies designed to spread employment opportunities more widely.

The first income-distribution issue to be addressed here is that regarding spatial inequalities of income distribution. Amin (1974:99–105) has argued that in West Africa migration exacerbates regional inequalities, especially urban-rural inequalities, since not only are the net gains of remittances in rural areas negligible (or perhaps even negative) but also the loss of a workforce badly affects accumulation of capital and agricultural production in the home region.

Resolution of the issue of the redistributive effect of migration within Indonesia must await more detailed studies. But existing studies in Java and many parts of the Outer Islands of Indonesia indicate that when both temporary and permanent migrants are considered, the net flow of remittances tends to favor the village, that the seasonal or periodic loss of labor from the village rarely results in loss of overall village productivity, and that many individuals and village communities would be in dire circumstances should their access to income-earning opportunities in cities and other centers of investment be curtailed.[8] On a larger scale involving consideration of all flows of goods and money between the rural and urban sectors, such as tax collection, the purchase of agricultural products in urban areas at government-regulated low prices, and other modes of extraction of rural-generated surpluses for investment in urban areas, it may be that the city's relationship to the village is parasitic. The evidence regarding the influence of population movement, however, especially temporary movement, on remittances and rural productivity is that such movement is producing a net gain in the areas of origin. Hence, in the absence of any other changes, if migration were to cease the village and the villagers would be worse off.

8. These of course are generalizations and one can point to exceptions. In one West Javan village I surveyed (1975, 1978) agricultural productivity had declined as a result of excessive out-migration. Moreover, out-movement tends to occur among the more innovative individuals who have leadership potential. In some cases out-migration has been a means of maintaining the rural status quo because potential leaders who would otherwise press for change in the village are lost to the community. Lineton (1975:193), for example, says that out-migration from parts of South Sulawesi has this "safety valve" function.

De Koninck (1979) has made an additional point that should be considered in examining the effect of remittances on rural-urban income distribution: that even if the net flow of remittances favors rural areas, it acts as one component in the commercialization and general penetration of money into the rural economy. According to him, this in turn will encourage increased local expenditure on consumer goods produced outside the rural economy (and often outside the country) and in so doing expose villagers to the possibility of exploitation by urban and foreign producers. This development may ultimately produce a balance of income distribution favoring urban areas rather than rural areas.

One of the few detailed studies of income transfers between regions was that undertaken in Kenya by Knowles and Anker (1977:7). They found that urban-to-rural transfers, while comprising only 37 percent of all recorded transfers, accounted for 50.4 percent of all income transferred, whereas rural-to-urban transfers constituted only 6.5 percent of all transfers and 6.3 percent of all income transferred. Rural-to-rural transfers comprised the largest proportion (46.3 percent of all transfers), reflecting the scale of this type of movement; but because of low rural incomes they accounted for only 28.4 percent of total income transferred. Moreover, the pretransfer Gini coefficient of income inequality for rural and urban households combined (0.672) was reduced to 0.664 when transfers were included. Knowles and Anker concluded that transfers result in a redistribution of income from high-income urban areas to lower-income rural areas and a reduction in the overall degree of inequality.

Oberai (1975) reported migration into Khartoum to have beneficial income-distribution effects. Fraenkel et al. (1975) found migration likely to worsen income inequalities in urban Brazil, but Yap (1976) found that migration improved distribution in Brazil as a whole. Stark (1976) and Gaude (1976) discussed a range of empirical studies that tend to find migration beneficial to income distribution. Hence the role of population mobility and remittances in exacerbating, ameliorating, or preserving spatial inequalities is as yet unclear; but it is certain that, as Rodgers (1977:19) has pointed out, ". . . such mobility as occurs is not sufficient to eliminate the major inter-sectoral and inter-regional wage differentials which characterize dualistic economies."

It is apparent that certain individuals and groups in the villages of origin do benefit substantially from remittances. As Connell (1981:

250) has stated, ". . . unequal access to migration opportunities inevitably mean[s] that the costs and benefits of migration are also unevenly distributed." Because of this unequal access to population mobility and differential propensity and ability to remit there will be substantial intervillage and intravillage variations in the effects of inremittances at the place of origin. Lipton (1980:4) found that two main groups tend to migrate from villages. The first consists of deficit farmers and landless laborers (although seldom the very poorest, who cannot afford the initial cost of movement); they are "pushed" out. The second consists of the children of bigger farmers, who are "pulled" out by the lure of education and prestigious nonagricultural occupations. It is important to realize that not all households in receipt of remittances are among the poorest in a village. Several studies (cited in Connell et al., 1976:95) have indicated that more prosperous households receive substantial remittances and that the poorest and neediest households may miss out completely on this source of income. But the evidence is mixed concerning whether the remittances that migrants send back to the village change income distribution at the place of origin.

Lipton (1980:3) states unequivocably that ". . . migrant streams are so structured that—contrary to the expectations of marginal analysis—their movement worsens overall distribution among remaining rural persons, among remaining rural persons plus migrants and between village and town." Lipton's (1980:11) argument that remittances do not foster intrarural or rural-urban equalization is as follows:

> First, total net remittances are very small compared with rural income in the great majority of villages, indeed they are often negative. Second, positive remittances go disproportionately to the better off; *townward* migrants, especially the remitters and above all the international remitters who send back really big sums, are seldom from the poorest village groups.

Similarly, Connell (1981:250) concludes that migration occurs because of inequality and it serves to emphasize and establish that inequality directly and indirectly. Both Lipton and Connell marshall evidence from field studies to support their view. However, examination of the literature indicates that the relationship between remittances and economic inequality is not a simple one.

One of the few studies to test explicitly the effect of remittances on village income distribution is that by Oberai and Singh (1980) in the Punjab. They found (p. 239) not only that remittances raised the

average income of out-migrant households by 31 percent but also that the Gini coefficient of income distribution fell by 17 percent (from 0.515 to 0.43) when remittances were considered as part of household income. Their findings confirm those of several other studies, in which the relative effect of remittances proved to be much greater on poorer than on better-off households. They also found that when all households in their survey were included in the analysis there was a decline in the Gini coefficient. The finding led them to conclude that remittances improve not only the distribution of income among out-migrant households but also the overall distribution of income in rural areas.

Knowles and Anker's (1977) study of Kenya provides a detailed analysis of the effect of income transfers on the size distribution of household incomes. Among rural households they found that the absolute level of transfers increased with income but that net transfers fell as a proportion of total income as income rose. They also observed a small drop in the Gini measure of income inequality (from 0.657 to 0.651) when transfers were added to income. Kothari (1980: 253) found in Rajasthan that migrant households received an average of 24 percent of their annual income from remittances, but that even if those transfers were not considered their income levels tended to be higher than those of nonmigrant households.

In Indonesia there has been little investigation of the income-redistribution effects of remittances. In my West Java study I found a consistent tendency for households with movers to have higher incomes than households without movers (stayers), and this difference was statistically significant. Table 3 shows that the differences were greatest among households with movers who were commuters or permanent migrants and least among those with circular migrants. Table 3 also indicates that it was remittances that made the incomes of temporary mover households higher than those of stayer households, whereas the incomes of households sending permanent migrants were substantially higher even when remittance income was excluded. One point of note is that circular migrants tended to be drawn from poorer households than either commuters or permanent migrants, and it is almost certain that the remittances associated with temporary migration had a more positive effect on income distribution within the village than those of permanent movers.

Thus the evidence regarding the effects on income distribution of

TABLE 3. Average annual incomes, excluding and including remittances, of mover and stayer households: West Javan survey villages, July 1972 to June 1973
(In thousands of rupiah)

Household type	Income	
	Excluding remittances	Including remittances
Stayer	87.3	87.3
Mover		
Commuter	73.4	184.4
Circular migrant	68.0	129.9
Permanent migrant	158.2	171.9

NOTE: US $1 = Rp 420 at time of survey.
SOURCE: Hugo (1978:268–83).

population mobility and migration, and more particularly the effects of the remittances they generate, is, as Rodgers (1977:30) explains, scattered and inconclusive. On the one hand there is some empirical evidence to support the a priori hypothesis that mobility reduces inequality, while on the other there is a body of evidence that suggests that mobility preserves or even increases inequality. Much of the inconclusiveness is due to the small number of detailed studies focusing on the impact of remittances from all forms of mobility upon income distribution. New studies should focus not only upon the short-term effects of migration and remittances but also upon their longer-term implications for income distribution. It may well be that the short-term effects are largely beneficial to rural areas, whereas the longer-term effects are detrimental. Any discussion of the desirability or undesirability of particular migration-related policies should be informed by a knowledge of both the short-term and the long-term effects of remittances on rural incomes and welfare, as well as on income distribution within rural areas and between urban and rural areas.

POPULATION MOBILITY AND THE FERTILITY TRANSITION

One of the basic propositions of Caldwell's reformulation of demographic transition theory is that the direction of net lifetime intergenerational wealth transfers is determined by the social structure of a community, especially as the theory relates to the family and the

nature of the relationships between family members. Caldwell (1976) argues that the primary force in the reversal of the direction of net intergenerational wealth flows is changes in the traditional system of family relationships involving a shift from an extended family, in which one's primary responsibilities and relationships are toward one's parents, to one that is economically and emotionally nucleated and in which relationships with one's spouse and children assume much greater significance. Caldwell suggests that in the West these changes in family structure were caused by a social revolution encompassing various developments, one of them being the introduction of compulsory mass schooling. He argues that a major cause of the initiation of fertility decline in the Third World has been the importation of European concepts of family relationships and obligations, and that from a demographic viewpoint the most important "social exports" from Europe have been the predominance of the nuclear family (especially strong husband-wife ties) and the concentration of concern and expenditure on one's children rather than on one's parents. The major vehicles of this importation, according to Caldwell, have been mass education and the mass media. One can also argue that population mobility is playing a major role in initiating this social change.

In the migration literature there have been a preoccupation with the economic changes brought about by population movement and a reluctance to examine the social and attitudinal effects of migration upon movers. Third World migration studies have exploded the myth that movement from village to city in itself deterministically effects major changes in the demographic, economic, and social behavior of individuals, transforming them into "modern" men and women (see, e.g., McGee, 1971; Abu Lughod, 1969; Perlman, 1973; Hugo, 1978: 200). Nevertheless, many movers are subjected to nontraditional influences as a direct result of their mobility. Although institutions associated with the family and community of origin usually cushion the impact of movement, most movers come into regular contact with nontraditional influences in working and living at their destination. Few studies have probed the extent to which this exposure has modified behavior, especially behavior relating to parent-child and conjugal relationships, and resulted in a challenge to the pattern of a net upward flow of wealth. This challenge is more likely to come from permanent than from circular migrants. Few empirical data are available, however, regarding the interactive role of population mobility, fer-

tility, and intrafamily wealth transfers and the extent to which it differs according to the type of mobility and the duration of absence of the mover. Although research on the fertility of migrants is very limited (Findley, 1977:66), there is evidence that the social factors that contribute to lower fertility among native urban women than among their rural counterparts can also affect migrant women in urban areas. In her literature review Findley (1977:66) lists several factors that appear to have this effect, including increased educational participation and attainment, increased workforce participation and commitment to work, greater participation in family decision-making processes, access to improved health care and family planning services, greater "modernism," and the increased level of family income.

Although many more or less permanent migrants maintain major commitments to their village of origin and even intend to return to it at some stage, a common finding is that over a long period the amount and regularity of remittances tend to decline (Connell et al., 1976). In several contexts a "drift towards individualism" over time has been noted among movers (Connell 1981:248). The drift manifests itself not only in a reduced proportion of income being remitted to the home area but also in more of those remittances being used to benefit the mover (e.g., for purchase of land or the building of a house) rather than to benefit the mover's parents.

Caldwell (1979:iii) has stated that migration "inevitably causes social changes" of the type that work toward a reversal in the direction of net intergenerational wealth flows. More research is needed that explicitly investigates and specifies the types of conditions under which population mobility initiates such social change.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to examine the significance of population mobility in transferring wealth within families in Third World societies. The discussion is hampered by a paucity of studies on this subject and also by the fact that most of the existing studies fail not only to detect most of the remittances that flow between movers and their families of origin but also to detect many of the moves that initiate wealth flows. The incompleteness of the studies' data, which have been used widely (and with apparent confidence in their accuracy), must make somewhat tentative most generalizations regarding the scale, determinants, and significance of wealth flows initiated by population mo-

bility. Nevertheless, it is clear that the flows associated with temporary moves tend to be greater not only in absolute amounts but also relative to the total income of both mover and family of origin. The growing importance of such movement in Southeast Asia (Goldstein, 1978) and elsewhere, and the fact that most conventional migration studies exclude this type of mobility, indicate a need for more information concerning the significance of the wealth flows associated with it. This paper has attempted to demonstrate that much of the population mobility initiated in Third World countries is oriented to the family rather than the individual, and that this family orientation contributes substantially to the flow of remittances, since the desire to increase wealth flows to parents, wife, children, and other relatives is frequently the reason for mobility in the first place. The large volume and impact of these flows and their importance to the livelihood of village families has been demonstrated in the paper with reference to data from West Java and several other regions.

Although our present limited understanding and knowledge of the linkages between population movement, wealth transfers, and fertility render any attempt at generalization somewhat presumptuous, a few propositions can be tentatively advanced. First, it would appear that the onset of high levels of population mobility, especially of temporary movement, supports the maintenance of stable high fertility in pretransitional societies. The reason is that mobility permits the family to extend the geographical area over which its members can search for work, the proceeds of which are channeled via traditional linkages back to the family to ensure a pattern of lifetime net intergenerational wealth flows favoring parents over children. The critical point here is that parents are no longer restricted to examining the income-producing opportunities in the local area when deciding upon the size of their family. Second, it would appear that in many cases this strategy to maintain and even enhance wealth transfers from children to parents contains the seeds of its own destruction. Spatial mobility may initiate changes within the movers that weaken the village-based family's control over the use to which the income earned by the movers is put. Population movement, especially that of a more permanent nature, frequently involves exposure of the movers to nontraditional influences that may produce in them a greater individualism, a greater loyalty to the nuclear than to the extended family, and ultimately a challenge to the upward flow of wealth. Such social changes are con-

ducive to a reversal of the net intergenerational wealth flow. Third, in the longer term it appears that population movement may hasten the transition from stable high fertility to a pattern of fertility decline. The extent to which this occurs will depend upon the nature and extent of the movers' commitment to their places of origin and destination, the degree of control that the village-based family can maintain over them, and the sanctions the family can bring to bear upon movers. It would appear that in many cases family control tends to decrease as the degree of permanency of the move and the mover's duration of absence increase.

Population mobility and the extent and significance of wealth flows that it generates between and within communities, classes, and generations in Third World societies is as yet little understood. New studies of migration and remittances should avoid the inadequacies of earlier research on intergenerational wealth flows cited by Caldwell (1976: 336–38). Too many remittance studies have failed to detect remittances sent and received by movers and have confined their scope to long-term migration. New studies also need to focus more clearly upon the role that remittances play within the receiving family. Studies of the effects of remittances have concentrated almost entirely upon the detection of employment-generating investment. They have overlooked the role that remittances play in maintaining net intergenerational wealth flows in the older generation's favor, with all the implications that such flows have for fertility. The extent to which population mobility does or does not initiate social changes conducive to fertility decline needs to be explicitly addressed in future research.

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